

## Message Text

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ACTION PM-04

INFO OCT-01 NEA-10 ISO-00 MC-02 ACDA-07 AID-05 IGA-02  
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P R 061141Z JUL 77  
FM AMEMBASSY TUNIS  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7382  
INFO USCINCEUR VAHINGEN GE/ECJ5

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 4 TUNIS 4742

JOINT EMBASSY/USLOT

E.O. 11652: GDS  
TAGS: MASS TS  
SUBJECT: ASSESSMENT OF US SECURITY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM FOR FY 79.

REF: STATE 133136 (DTG 091616Z JUN 77 CONFIDENTIAL)  
US CINCEUR P 171120Z JUN 77 (NOTAL)

1. THE FOLLOWING IS AN ASSESSMENT OF U.S. SECURITY ASSISTANCE  
PROGRAMS FOR TUNISIA FOR FY 1979.  
PARAGRAPH REFERENCES ARE IN ACCORD WITH PARAGRAPHS OF ORIGINAL  
MESSAGE.

A. PARA 3. U.S. INTERESTS SERVED BY MAINTAINING A SEC-  
74856 ASSISTANCELRELATIONSHIP WITH HOST COUNTRY.  
(1) TUNISIA'S LOCATION , APPROXIMATELY MIDWAY BETWEEN  
THE SUEZ CANAL AND GIBRALTER AND COMMANDING THE NARROW  
PASSAGE BETWEEN NORTH AFRICA AND SICILY, ACCORDS IT AN  
IMPORTANCE TO U.S. INTERESTS FAR GREATER THAN ITS SIZE  
AND RESOURCES INDICATE. THIS IMPORTANCE HAS GROWN IN  
RECENT TIMES WITH RISING UNCERTAINTIES OVER THE POLITICAL  
FUTURE OF ITALY AND GROWING INSTABILITY IN LIBYA AS WELL  
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AS THE EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN. WITH SOVIET NAVAL PRESENCE  
IN THE MEDITERRANEAN INCREASING, TUNISIA REMAINS THE  
ONLY COUNTRY ON THE SOUTHERN PERIPHERY OF THE MEDITER-  
RANEAN LITTORAL WHICH OFFERS REGULAR AND VARIED ACCESS  
TO ITS PORTS AND WATERS FOR U.S. WARSHIPS, INCLUDING  
NUCLEAR POWERED VESSELS.

(2) TUNISIA'S PRO-U.S. ORIENTATION AND MODERATING INFLUENCE IN ARAB POLITICAL CIRCLES IS OF PARTICULAR VALUE IN VIEW OF THE EXISTENCE OF THE UNCOOPERATIVE ATTITUDES OF LIBYA AND SOME OF THE OTHER MORE RADICAL ARAB STATES. ADDITIONALLY TUNISIA HAS TRADITIONALLY FOLLOWED MODERATE POLICIES IN AFRICAN AND THIRD WORLD AFFAIRS AND HAS GENERALLY BEEN SUPPORTATIVE OF WESTERN INTERESTS ON BROAD INTERNATIONAL ISSUES.

(3) THE AMBASSADOR'S PERSONAL COMMENTS FOLLOW: TUNISIA FITS THE TEMPLATE FOR A COUNTRY WHICH NEEDS OUR CONTINUED MILITARY SUPPORT. HER GOVERNMENT IS FRIENDLY TO THE UNITED STATES AND SHE SUPPORTS OUR NATIONAL INTERESTS. SHE HAS A STABLE INTERNAL GOVERNMENT AND HAS DEVELOPED HER ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL NEEDS BEFORE TACKLING HER MILITARY REQUIREMENTS. SHE HAS A PERCEIVED EXTERNAL THREAT FROM LIBYA AND, TO A LESSER DEGREE, FROM ALGERIA. HER ARMED FORCES ARE APOLITICAL. THEY ARE IN DIRE NEED OF EQUIPMENT MODERNIZATION; THE AIR FORCE FLIES KOREAN-WAR VINTAGE F-86S, THE ARMY HAS KOREAN-WAR M-41 LIGHT TANKS WITH A SMATTERING OF LATE 1950'S M48 TANKS; THE NAVY HAS A FEW PATROL BOATS AND ONE RENOVATED U.S. WORLD WAR II DESTROYER. THE TUNISIAN ARMED FORCES ARE WELL TRAINED; THEY TAKE CARE OF THE EQUIPMENT THEY POSSESS. HER WESTERN-EDUCATED OFFICER CORPS IS INDUSTRIOUS AND RELIABLE. TUNISIA IS COMMITTED FINANCIALLY TO A MODEST ARMS IMPROVEMENT PROGRAM. SHE NEEDS THE CONTINUED SUPPORT OF THE UNITED STATES. WE THINK SHE SHOULD HAVE IT.

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B. PARA 4A THREAT-PRESENT AND POTENTIAL

(1) EXTERNAL: (A) ALGERIA AND LIBYA POSE A POTENTIAL THREAT TO TUNISIA BECAUSE OF DIFFERENCES IN POLITICAL ORIENTATION AND BECAUSE OF THEIR MILITARY SUPERIORITY. THIS FEAR BECAME EVEN MORE PRONOUNCED IN LATE 1975 WHEN THERE WERE EVIDENCES OF INCREASED LIBYAN-ALGERIAN COORDINATION ON REGIONAL ISSUES, AND IN EARLY 1976 IN LIGHT OF LIBYAN ATTEMPTS TO ASSASSINATE THE TUNISIAN PRIME MINISTER AND OTHER OFFICIALS. IN JULY 1976, TUNISIAN FORCES WENT ON ALERT DUE TO FEAR OF A LIBYAN INVASION OR TERRORIST ACTIVITY. THE TUNISIAN MILITARY WAS AGAIN PLACED ON FULL ALERT IN MAY 1977 FOLLOWING A FLARE-UP OF THE LONG EXISTING DISPUTE OVER THE TUNISIAN-LIBYAN CONTINENTAL SHELF. DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS HAVE BEEN MODERATED SINCE LIBYA AGREED IN JUNE 1977 TO SUBMIT THE CONTINENTAL SHELF DISPUTE TO THE WORLD COURT. TUNISIA CONTINUES TO DISTRUST LIBYAN INTENTIONS, AND LIBYA HAS CONSTANTLY BLAMED TUNISIA FOR THE FAILURE OF A LIBYA-TUNISIA MERGER AGREEMENT IN 1974. WITH THIS BACKGROUND

OF MISTRUST AND RECRIMINATION, RELATIONS COULD AGAIN TAKE A TURN DOWNWARD SHOULD DIFFICULTIES ARISE IN THE APPLICATION OF AN EVENTUAL ARBITRATION DECISION ON THE CONTINENTAL SHELF. RELATIONS WITH ALGERIA WERE SEVERELY STRAINED IN LATE 1975 AND EARLY 1976 DUE TO TUNISIA'S SUPPORT OF MORROCCO OVER THE SAHARAN ISSUE. FACED WITH HARSH CRITICISM ON THE PART OF ALGERIA, TUNISIA QUICKLY SOUGHT TO EXTRICATE ITSELF FROM THE DISPUTE. RELATIONS HAVE SINCE IMPROVED, ALTHOUGH IMPORTANT AND BASIC IDEOLOGICAL DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES REMAIN.

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P R 061141Z JUL 77

FM AMEMBASSY TUNIS

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7383

INFO USCINCEUR VAHINGEN GE/ECJ5

S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 4 TUNIS 4742

JOINT EMBASSY/USLOT

(2) INTERNAL: THE CURRENT REGIME OF PRESIDENT BOURGUIBA, WHILE AN AUTHORITARIAN ONE BASED ON A SINGLE POLITICAL ORGANIZATION, THE DESTOURIAN SOCIALIST PARTY, IS RELATIVELY BENIGN. THE POLITICAL SYSTEM IS GENERALLY OPEN AND THE VAST MAJORITY OF THE TUNISIAN PEOPLE STRONGLY SUPPORT THE PRESIDENT AND THE POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS WHICH HE HAS FORGED. TUNISIA, HOWEVER IS NOW ENTERING A CRITICAL STAGE OF ITS HISTORY. PRESIDENT BOURGUIBA, NOW 75 YEARS OLD (OFFICIAL AGE 73) AND IN FAILING HEALTH, IS APPROACHING THE END OF HIS ROLE AS TUNISIA'S LEADER. ALTHOUGH THE CONSTITUTION HAS RECENTLY BEEN ALTERED TO DESIGNATE THE PRIME MINISTER AS PRESIDENTIAL SUCCESSOR, THE INCUMBENT, PRIME MINISTER HEDI NOUIRA, DOES NOT ENJOY GREAT POWER OR PRESTIGE IN HIS OWN RIGHT. CRITICISM AGAINST THE REGIME'S POLITICAL REGIDITY IS GROWING, ESPECIALLY AMONG YOUTH AND ORGANIZED LABOR. DISCONTENT WILL PERHAPS BE MORE OPENLY VOICED ONCE PRESIDENT BORGIBA

PASSES.

(3) TUNISIA'S BASIC DEFENSE STRATEGY IS TWO FOLD. FIRST,  
HER STRATEGY IS TO POSSESS SUFFICIENT GROUND CAPABILITY  
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TO CONDUCT A DELAYING ACTION AGAINST A THREAT FROM  
EITHER LIBYA OR ALGERIA WHILE ENSURING ADEQUATE AIR  
PROTECTION FOR THE CAPITAL. SECONDLY, IT IS TO USE THE  
TIME GAINED TO ORGANIZE INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT IN THE  
UNITED NATIONS AND ELSEWHERE.

C. PARA 4B-N/A

D. PARA 4C-(1) TUNISIA IS DESIGNING ITS MILITARY COMPLEX  
FOR A STRICTLY DEFENSEIVE ROLE. RECENT MODIFICATIONS AND  
REORGANIZATIONS OF THE TUNISIAN ARMY GIVE CREDENCE TO  
THIS CONCEPT. TUNISIA IS FULLY AWARE OF THE VAST BORDERS  
IT POSSESSES AND THE TUNISIANS HAVE DESIGNED THE ARMY  
DISPERSEMENT FOR BETTER DEFENSIVE COVERAGE OF THESE BORDERS.  
ALL EXISTING (1977) MILITARY EQUIPMENT IS WW II OR  
KOREAN WAR VINTAGE AND MT BEST CAN PROVIDE ONLY TOKEN RE-  
SISTANCE TO ANY THREAT. THE ANNOUNCED 5-YEAR MODERNIZ-  
ATION PROGRAM FOR THE TUNISIAN MILITARY CONTINUES TO BUILD  
UP THE DEFENSIVE CAPABILITY OF THIS COUNTRY. GOT HAS  
SIGNED A LETTER OF OFFER TO PURCHASE A CHAPARRAL MISSILE  
SYSTEM UNDER FMS AND DOCUMENTATION IS IN PROCESS FOR ADDI-  
TIONAL FMS COMMITMENT TO ACQUIRE RELATED FAAR AND VULCAN  
SYSTEMS. THIS PACKAGE, WOEN OPERATIONAL IN 1979, WILL  
CONTRIBUTE SIGNIFICANTLY TO TUNISIA'S DEFENSE NEEDS. PRO-  
GRAMMED PROCUREMENT OF COASTAL PATROL CRAFT, ANTI-TANK  
WEAPONS, INTERCEPTOR AIRCRAFT, AND LONG RANGE EARLY WARN-  
ING RADAR WILL COMPLIMENT TUNISIAN POLICY OF STOJ-PROTECTION.

(2) THE DEFENSIVE CONCEPT OF THE TUNISIAN MILITARY  
WARRANTS CONTINUED SUPPORT FROM USG. TUNISIA HAS NO  
DESIGNS ON ANY OF ITS NEGBORS, AND ITS MILITARY  
POSTEURE IS DEFENSEIVE ONLY. THE U.S. COUNTRY TEAM IN  
TUNISIA AGREES TO THE DESIGN AND CONCEPT OF THE TUNISIAN  
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MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT, WHICH IS VIEWED AS COMPLIMENTARY  
OF U.S. POLICY IN NORTH AFRICA AND THE MEDITERRANEAN.  
THE COUNTRY TEAM ALSO BELIEVES THAT THERE ARE NO REAL-  
ISTIC ALTERNATIVES WHICY WOULD BE LESS COSTLY OR WHICH  
WOULD BE MORE BENEFICIAL TO U.S. INTERESTS.

E. PARA 4D. PROJECTIONS OF SPECIFIC DEFENSE ARTICLES AND DEFENSE SERVICES FOR FY 79 (IN PRIORITY ORDER): AT THE CURRENT RATE OF TUNISIA'S PURCHASES FOR THEIR MODERNIZATION PROGRAM, IT IS ANTICIPATED THAT THE CHAPARRAL-VOLCAN-FAAR AIR DEFENSE SYSTEM, A WHEEL VEHICLE-MOUNTED TOW ANTI-TANK SYSTEM, AND TWO COMPANIES OF M48A5 TANKS WILL HAVE BEEN ORDERED (BUT PAYMENT NOT COMPLETED) PRIOR TO FY 79. DEPENDING ON USG CREDIT AVAILABILITY, IT IS FORECAST THAT IN FY 79 TUNISIA WILL PURCHASE 18 M109A1

155 MM SP ARTILLERY, SIX 105 FT PATROL BOATS, AND TWO 165 FT PATROL BOATS WITH PRIORITY GOING TO THE 155 MM ARTILLERY. FMS CREDIT WILL BE USED TO PURCHASE AS MUCH OF THE EQUIPMENT AS POSSIBLE. TUNISIA WILL CONTINUE TO PURCHASE SUPPLY SUPPORT ARRANGEMENTS FOR PREVIOUSLY PURCHASED USG ITEMS AND WILL CONTINUE WITH PROFESSIONAL AND MILITARY TRAINING UNDER IMET PROGRAM. IN ADDITION TO IMPROVING THE TECHNICAL EXPERTISE OF THE TUNISIAN MILITARY, IMET AIDS IN CREATING A BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF THE US GOVERNMENT AND THE PHILOSOPHIES ON WHICH THIS SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT IS BASED.

F. PARA 4E (1) TUNISIA HAS LAUNCHED A 5-YEAR MODERNIZATION PROGRAM FOR ITS MILITARY FORCES. FY 1979 PURCHASES WILL FALL WITHIN THE MID-POINT OF THIS MODERNIZATION PLAN. TUNISIA TRADITIONALLY HAS DEVOTED NO MORE THAN 6 PERCENT OF ANNUAL CAPITAL GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURES TO THE MINISTRY OF DEFENSE (MOD), HOWEVER COMMENCING WITH CY 77 BUDGET, THE GOVERNMENT HAS INCREASED THIS ALLOCATION TO ROUGHLY 9 PERCENT. FOR FY 77, THE TN MOD HAS THE AUTHORITY  
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TO OBLIGATE \$91.8 MILLION FOR PURCHASES AND IS AUTHORIZED TO USE \$47.6 MILLION FOR PAYMENT ON PREVIOUS OBLIGATIONS. ADDITIONALLY, FOR THE LONG TERM PROJECTION, THE TUNISIAN MOD HAS BEEN ALLOCATED A \$306 MILLION CAPITAL BUDGET OF WHICH \$82 MILLION (27 PERCENT ) IS FOR CONSTRUCTION AND NORMAL PROGRAMS AND \$224 MILLION (73 PERCENT) IS FOR ACQUISITION OF NEW MILITARY HARDWARE.

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USIA-06 EB-07 /082 W

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P R 061141Z JUL 77  
FM AMEMBASSY TUNIS  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7384  
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JOINT EMBASSY /USLOT

(2) THE OPERATING BUDGET FOR THE TN MOD HAS INCREASED 11.6 PERCENT OVER LAST YEAR'S BUDGET, CONSISTENT WITH THE OVERALL BUDGET INCREASES OVER 1975. THE SIZE OF THIS OPERATING BUDGET AND THE OBLIGATION AUTHORITY OF THE CY 77 CAPITAL BUDGET REPRESENTS 3.7 PERCENT OF TOTAL GNP. IN THE ABSENCE OF COMMERCIAL SOURCES OF MILITARY HARDWARE WITHIN THEIR COUNTRY, TUNISIA STANDS TO OBLIGATE APPROXIMATELY 1.9 PERCENT GNP TO EXPENDITURES OF MILITARY EQUIPMENT OUTSIDE OF TUNISIA. THE REMAINING 1.8 PERCENT OF EXPECTED GNP TO BE EXPENDED IN TUNISIA FOR CONSTRUCTION OF FACILITIES IMPROVEMENT, ETC.

(3) THE PROJECTION FOR FY 79 TUNISIAN MILITARY SPENDING INDICATE NO GREAT DEPARTURE FROM CURRENT YEAR BUDGET. OBLIGATION AUTHORITY WILL MOST PROBABLY DECREASE WHILE THE OPERATING BUDGET WILL LIKELY REMAIN FAIRLY CONSTANT, AND PAYMENTS FOR PAST OBLIGATIONS WILL PROBABLY INCREASE. TUNISIA APPEARS AT THE PRESENT TO BE WELL AWARE OF ITS FINANCIAL LIMITATION AND IS NOT OVER-COMMITTING ITSELF BEYOND ITS REPAYMENT CAPABILITIES. LONG TERM CREDIT SUCH AS RECEIVED FROM USG GUARANTY CREDIT IS FAVORABLE TO ITS  
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NEEDS AND IS THE FRAMEWORK FOR ITS MILITARY EXPANSION.

G. PARA 4F REQUIREMENTS FOR USG OR CIVILIAN CONTRACT PERSONNEL REQUIRED FOR IN-COUNTRY ASSISTANCE WILL BE IN SUPPORT OF CHAPARRAL, FAAR, VULCAN DELIVERIES. WE ANTICIPATE THREE TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE PEOPLE TO BE IN-COUNTRY FOR ONE YEAR EACH. TWO MTTS OF A YET TO BE DETERMINED NUMBER WILL ARRIVE MID FY79. AS EVIDENCED BY RECENT ASSISTANCE TEAMS, THE GOVERNMENT OF TUNISIA

WILCOMES THIS AID AND WE FORSEE NO ADVERSE PROBLEMS FROM THEIR ADDED PRESENCE.

H. PARA 4GLSIMILAR TYPES OF DEFENSE ARTICLES ARE READILY AVAILABLE FROM SEVERAL OTHER COUNTRIES. IF THE USG DENIES THE GOT THE RIGHT TO PURCHASE THESE NEEDS THE GOT WILL UNDOUBTABLY TURN TO OTHER SOURCES OF PROCUREMENT.

K. PARA 4H. ARMS CONTROL IMPACT. FOR THE PURCHASE OF EIGHTEEN 155 MM SP HOWITZERS AND THE EIGHT PATROL BOATS, THE ESTIMATED SALES PRICE OF EACH EXCEEDS \$7 MILLION, HOWEVER IS LESS THAN \$25 MILLION. EACH PURCHASE WILL BE CLASSIFIED AS A MAJOR DEFENSE ITEM AND WILL REQUIRE CONGRESSIONAL AUTHORIZATION. TUNISIA'S DESIRE FOR AN IMPROVED LAND AND SEA DEFENSE IS DESIGNED TO COUNTER HIGHLY SOPHISTICATED, MODERN WEAPONS POSSESSED BY BOTH ALGERIA AND LIBYA. THE MAJOR WEAPON SYSTEMS STOCKPILED IN LIBYA OUTNUMBER TUNISIA'S APPROXIMATELY 5:1. THE COMBINED ALGERIAN-LIBYAN QUANTITATIVE ADVANTAGE IS ABOUT 10:1 OVER TUNISIA. THE QUALITY OF LIBYAN AND ALGERIAN WEAPONS IS MUCH MORE MODERN THAN ANY SYSTEM IN THE CURRENT TUNISIA INVENTORY.

J. PARA 4 I. HUMAN RIGHTS (1) TUNISIAN AUTHORITIES GENERALLY  
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GENERALLY RESPECT HUMAN RIGHTS AS THEY ARE INTERNATIONALLY RECOGNIZED. AT PRESENT HUMAN RIGHTS CONDITIONS IN TUNISIA CAN BE CATEGORIZED AS RELATIVELY "VERY GOOD" WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF LESS DEVELOPED NATIONS HAVING SIMILAR HISTORICAL AND CULTURAL EXPERIENCES. THERE HAVE BEEN SOME CHARGES OF POLICE BRUTALITY OR TORTURE, BUT WE HAVE NO EVIDENCE AT OUR DISPOSAL SUSTAINING THESE ALLEGATIONS, MOST OF WHICH HAVE COME FROM ANTI-GOVERNMENT ELEMENTS WHOSE OBJECTIVITY COULD BE SUSPECT. THE GOT HAS VEHEMENTLY DENIED THESE CHARGES, AND ON THE WHOLE HAS A GOOD RECORD FOR RESPECT OF THE INTEGRITY OF THE PERSON. WHILE THE TUNISIAN CONSTITUTION GUARANTEES FREEDOM OF THE PRESS, ASSEMBLY AND EXPRESSION, IN PRACTICE SUCH INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS ARE SOMETIMES CURTAILED WHEN IMMEDIATE SECURITY INTERESTS OF THE STATE ARE SEEN TO BE DIRECTLY CONCERNED. DISSIDENCE, WHILE CONSTRAINED, IS ALLOWED WITHIN THE CONFINES OF THE OFFICIAL PARTY, THE DESTOURIAN SOCIALIST PARTY, WHERE NEARLY ALL MAJOR ELEMENTS OF THE TUNISIAN SOCIETY ARE REPRESENTED. IN SPITE OF THE MAINTENANCE OF A ONE PARTY STATE, "POLITICAL ORTHODOXY" IS BROADLY DEFINED.

(2) THERE ARE INDICATIONS THAT THE TUNISIAN GOVERNMENT IS INCREASINGLY AWARE OF THE IMPORTANCE OF HUMAN RIGHTS AS

BOTH A DOMESTIC AND AN INTERNATIONAL ISSUE. AUTHORIZATION OF THE FORMATION OF A TUNISIAN LEAGUE FOR THE RIGHTS OF MAN IN APRIL 1977 IS AN EXAMPLE OF THIS GROWING SENSITIVITY. THIS REPRESENTS A SIGNIFICANT POLITICAL DEPARTMENT FOR THE GOVT, AS AT NO TIME PREVIOUSLY HAD THE GOVERNMENT AUTHORIZED THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A POLITICALLY ORIENTED GROUP OUTSIDE OF THE ESTABLISHED PARTY-GOVERNMENTAL INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE. THE LEAGUE IS ASSOCIATED WITH THE INTERNATIONAL FEDERATION FOR THE RIGHTS OF MAN AND ITS MANDATE ENCOMPASSES HUMAN RIGHTS IN GENERAL. THE GOVERNMENT'S APPROVAL OF THE LEAGUE'S FORMATION NOW INDICATES A WILLINGNESS TO ENTER INTO A PUBLIC DISCUSSION #

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HUMAN RIGHTS IN TUNISIA AS WELL AS ELSEWHERE. WHILE IT IS POSSIBLE THAT CHARGES OF HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS IN TUNISIA WILL BE BROUGHT TO THE ATTENTION OF THE USG AND THE AMERICAN CONGRESS, WE DO NOT BELIEVE THEY WOULD BE OF A SERIOUSNESS TO AFFECT THE FAVORABLE ATTITUDES OF CONGRESS AND THE AMERICAN PEOPLE TOWARD TUNISIA.

NOTE BY OC/T: #AS RECEIVED

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P R 061141Z JUL 77

FM AMEMBASSY TUNIS

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7385

INFO USCINCEUR VAHINGEN GE/ECJ5

S E C R E T SECTION 4 OF 4 TUNIS 4742



JOINT EMBASSY/USLOT

(3) WERE WE TO TERMINATE OR REDUCE ANY OR ALL OF OUR ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS, THE ADVANCEMENT OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN TUNISIA MIGHT NOT ONLY BE ARRESTED BUT COULD REGRESS. WE DO NOT BELIEVE THAT THE THREAT OF DENIAL OF US SECURITY ASSISTANCE WOULD AFFECT GOT ATTITUDES CONCERNING POLITICAL OPPOSITION AND PUBLIC CRITICISM. SHOULD SECURITY ASSISTANCE BE DENIED, THE GOT COULD PERCEIVE AN EVEN GREATER DANGER TO ITS SECURITY THAN BEFORE AND MIGHT EMPLOY HARSHER METHODS TO SUPPRESS OPPONENTS, RESULTING IN MORE RATHER THAN FEWER VIOLATIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS THAN HERETOFORE. FORTUNATELY BOTH FOR THE GOT AND THE USG, HUMAN RIGHTS CONDITIONS IN TUNISIA DO NOT MAKE THE DENIAL OF SECURITY ASSISTANCE A NEEDED OR YEALISTIC POLICY ALTERNATIVE.

K. PARA 4J. REALIZING THAT THE U.S. POLICY OF RESTRAINT CAN HAVE LIMITED EFFECT WITHOUT MULTILATERAL COOPERATION, WE BELIEVE THAT TUNISIA WILL BE HESITANT TO REDUCE HER ARMS MODERNIZATION PROGRAM. TUNISIA HAS DEDICATED HER RESOURCES TOWARDS OBJECTIVES OTHER THAN MILITARY FOR MANY YEARS. TUNISIA IS FINANCIALLY COMMITTED TO THE PRUCHASE OF THE CHAPARRAL-VULCAN-FAAR AIR DEFENSE SYSTEM AND WILL  
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NEED FY 79 FMS CREDITS AS DRAW-DOWN PAYMENTS FOR THESE FMS CONTRACTS. TUNISIA WILL NOT BE A SUPPLIER OF ARMS SINCE WHE HAS NO ARMAMENT PRODUCING CAPABILITY. WHE WILL BE A PURCHASER OF ARMAMENTS AND WILL NEED FY 79 AS WELL AS FY 80 FMS CREDITS TO PURCHASE HER ARTILLERY AND PATROL CRAFT NEEDS. AFTER COMPLETION OF HER ARMS MODERNAIZATION PROGRAM, WHEN HER DEFENSIVE POSTURE IS IMPROVED WE FORSEE THAT TUNISIA COULD SUPPORT THE U.S. POLICY OF RESTRAINT IN ARMS SALES AND PURCHASES.

L PARA 4 K IMETP FOR FY 79 WILL BE PRIMARILY DIRECTED TOWARD PROFESSIONAL MILITARY EDUCATION WHICH HAS PROVEN TO BE OF MAXIMUM MUTUAL BENEFIT TO THE UNITED STATES AND TUNISIA. THERE WILLCONTINUE TO BE A NEED FOR SOME LIMITED TECHNICAL TRAINING THROUGH IOETP ON A SELECTIVE BASIS. MAJOR FMS PURCHASES, SUCH AS, CHAPARRAL, VULCAN AND FAAR WILL INCLUDE A TRAINING LETTER OF OFFER AND ACCEPTANCE. TUNISIA WOULD PROBABLY PURCHASE TRAINING IN GREAT BRITAIN, FRANCE, GREECE OR ITALY RATHER THAN PAY TRANSPORTATION AND LIVING ALLOWANCES FOR TRAINING IN THE UNITED STATES. ALTHOUGH TUNISIA RECOGNIZES THE SUPERIOR QUALITY OF U.S. MILITARY TRAINING, SUCH TRAINING IS VIEWED AS ESPECIALLY EXPENSIVE WHEN COMPARED TO LOWER COSTS FOR TRANING IN EUROPE.

2. FOR USCINCEUR/ECJ5, THIS COMBINED EMBASSY/USLOT  
REPORT IS IN RESPONSE TO YOUR REQUEST 171120Z JUNE 77.  
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## Message Attributes

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**Type:** TE  
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Declassified/Released  
US Department of State  
EO Systematic Review  
22 May 2009  
**Markings:** Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 22 May 2009